Research
Research
Working Papers
Formerly: Welfare Devolution: Tool of Exclusion or Expansion?
Abstract: Diverse societies are often associated with smaller welfare systems. Scholars argue that federalism can exacerbate the effect of diversity on these systems and inequality within a society by allowing state and local officials to more easily restrict access to welfare programs. In this paper, I examine the role federalism plays in the design and implementation of redistributive programs through a model of flexible delegation in which localities receive some control over welfare programs. A legislative body and executive bargain over levels of taxation and whether to allow this flexible delegation in the form of waivers-- exemptions from federal welfare requirements. When localities have access to flexible delegation, taxation weakly increases. Inequality, relative to a world without it, decreases in expectation. I test the model’s implications using data from the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and find partial support for the results of the model.
The Politics of State Rainy Day Fund Investment
R&R
Abstract: When do states save for natural disasters and economic downturns? How do partisan competition and majority party agenda control influence these decisions? I develop a two stage bargaining model of state rainy day fund (RDF) investment. In the first stage, a legislator from the majority party proposes an allocation of the budget between an RDF, particularistic good, and public good. Before the second stage, there is an election and an economic crisis may occur. If a crisis occurs, the legislature can access an existing RDF to fund relief. The model predicts that supermajorities and other similar requirements to create larger winning coalitions incentivize RDF investment. Further, legislators face a trade off between funding public goods and saving. A greater preference for public goods simultaneously increases the demand for saving and spending on first stage public goods-- decreasing the legislature's ability to invest in the RDF. Partisanship further complicates a legislature's willingness to save. A majority party is more likely to save as its reelection chances increases.
Dynamic Delegation (with Michael Ting and David Simpson)
Abstract: This paper develops a model of delegation over time in a separation of powers system. As in standard delegation models, a legislative majority chooses both a statute and a delegation level for an executive to implement, where delegation can exploit agency knowledge but also introduces policy bias. The legislature must also worry about future executive and legislative players, who may introduce new legislation. The key feature of the model is the presidential veto, which can protect status quo statutes from new legislation. The model predicts that under unified government, the legislature will under-delegate because it expects the future political environment to be less favorable. Under divided government, it over-delegates in order to take advantage of the possibility of having future control of the executive and its veto power. Thus, divided government may account for the substantial accumulation of presidential powers in recent decades.
Works in Progress
Designing Welfare Eligibility